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LIABILITY VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY IN SPACE LAW: 
MISCONCEPTION OR MISCONSTRUCTION? 
Frans G. von der Dunk 
International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University, 
The Netherlands 
~ 
The relation between the two legal notions of 'responsibility' and 
'liability' in space law has never been dealt with in a comprehensive 
fashion. The paper sets out to do this, although the problem turns out 
to be too complex to really realize that goal. First it goes back to those 
notions as they are dealt with in general international law, where their 
relation has indeed been a topic for discussion and research. The 
notions are analyzed with three key concepts as guidelines: the 
indispensable criteria for each of the notions to become applicable; the 
role of 'due care' as a special problem regarding attributability in each 
of the two cases; and the consequences once the respective notions are 
found to be applicable. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion, that the traditional construction 
of the two concepts in general international law is a misconstruction. 
The International Law Commission's efforts at redefinition of the 
concepts indeed manages to avoid this misconstruction, however, at the 
cost of creating a misconception. 
Transferred to space law, analysis of the two notions along the same 
lines leads to the conclusion that here the traditional construction is 
followed, with only a minor improvement relating to the 'due care' 
concept. The consequences of this misconstruction are then indicated, 
. and claimed to be not merely of theoretical and academic importance. 
On the other hand, it is argued that application of the ILC's 
misconception to space law would not solve those problems either. For 
these reasons finally a much more simplifying option is proposed, 
which would mean, however, in space law as well as in general 
international law, a radical change, or rather amendment to the existing 
rules in those respects, read Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space 
. Treaty as to outer space. 
1. Introduction: responsibility vs. liability? 
'Responsibility' and 'liability' are two important terms in international 
law pointing to two fundamental principles; space law does not differ in 
this respect. Thus, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,1 the 
Magna Charta of space law, speaks of the international responsibility of 
states for national activities in space to be in conformity with the treaty, 
and another article, Article VII of the same treaty, of the liability of 
states for damage towards other states or their nationals or property. 
The two principles seem nicely divided, no link or relation established, 
no trouble arising.2 Thus, if states fear that they run a risk of having to 
pay as a consequence of some space activity under their authority 
having gone wrong, they take a careful look at Article VII and the 
ensuing Liability Conventions, and that would seem to suffice. 
On closer look, however, the two principles seem far less completely 
and clearly independent from and unrelated to' each other than 
suggested, although most authors on space law do not seem to be very 
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much aware of the fact - or care. Yet, already the fact that both the 
French and the Spanish languages - after all, both authentic languages 
as far as the Outer Space Treaty is concerned!4 - have only one term 
for the two notions ("responsabilite" and "responsabilidad" respectively) 
should warn of such carelessness.5 And when one considers 
furthermore that Article VI defmes the activities for which anyone 
state exactly can become responsible differently from Article VII's 
definition of the activities for which anyone state exactly can become 
liable, and a discussion is already going on for many years about how 
exactly to interpret the vague definition of Article VI - in the sense of 
Article VII, or indeed not? - one indeed starts to wonder: is there 
some kind of misconstruction or misconception at play here? After all, 
"[a]n inaccurate use of terminology may sometimes be of but little 
importance, and discussion of it may be merely a quibble. But accuracy 
of expression becomes important when it appears that inaccuracy is 
due to a confusion of thought in the understanding or application of 
proper rules or principles of law."B 
2. The starting point: 
responsibility in general international law 
When analyzing the problem thus coming to life one should start with 
general international law. Space law is really only a lex specialis when 
compared to the much older body of general international law, being 
derived from it as far as practical with an eye to the peculiarities of 
space as a realm of law of its own. Hence, international law provides a 
general background to the problem of responsibility and liability as it is 
in regard of space law as well, and helps interpreting that lex generalis 
where it is not clear or elaborated enough. Articles I and III of the 
Outer Space Treaty incorporate general international law even for the 
larger part explicitly in the body of space law? 
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Let us therefore first take a look at the two principles as dealt with 
under international law in its more earthly configuration, and especially 
as dealt with by the International Law Commission, the authoritative 
organ established by the General Assembly of the UN to codify and 
develop public international law.8 The ILC, to be sure, also wrestled 
with the problem already from the beginning,S and decided to deal 
with the two topics by way of two different sets of draft articles to be 
developed and ultimately presented to the General Assembly as treaties 
ready for signature and ratification by states. The subject of state 
responsibility was the first to be tackled, the First Report on the 
subject being completed by the ILC in 1969. 
Essential for the topic as it will be dealt with in regard of space law 
are the following three elements of the concept. State responsibility, 
first, means responsibility for "internationally wrongful acts,,'0 towards 
another state. The two decisive criteria for state responsibility to arise 
are therefore that "a breach of an international obligation of the 
[responsible] State" in respect of the second state has taken place, 
which is called 'objective fault',ll and that that breach "is attributable 
to the [responsible] State under international lavl'.12 In other words, 
two elements which in many domestic legal systems are (additionally) 
indispensable criteria for defining a wrongful act do not count on the 
international level: the element of subjective fault or "culpa", in the 
sense of knowingly or even purposefully violating a rule,'3 and the 
element of damage. The mere attributable breach of an international 
obligation, without subjective fault and without damage (whatever the 
exact definition and scope of that term), is already enough to incur 
state responsibility.14 
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In this respect it must be added that the question of breach of an 
international obligation is in each particular case to be answered by 
reference to the relevant legal relation between the states involved, i.e. 
by finding out what treaty or customary rules, and sometimes also 
general principles of law, do apply.15 
As a second element for our analysis however, a special problem 
concerning the question of attributability indeed is much more relevant. 
A state is respousible for "acts of the state", however defined but 
always involving (a degree of) state authority through some state organ 
or another, whereas it can not be held responsible as such for acts of 
private persons done in a private capacity.16 
The exception here is provided for by the famous principle of 'due 
care' (or 'due diligence') responsibility, meaning a state can incur 
responsibility in case of private acts taking place on its territory or 
being perpetrated by its national, and amounting to violations of 
international obligations, if the state could reasonably have prevented 
such acts.17 This is the logical consequence of the jurisdiction of a 
state over its territory (through the territorial sovereignty principle) and 
its nationals, natural or juridical (through the active nationality-
principle): 18 a duty to use this jurisdiction as far as reasonable to 
prevent other state's rights from being infringed. 
Thirdly and finally, another important aspect of the doctrine of state 
responsibility must be mentioned. To be sure, the ILC has not yet 
finished the part of its Draft articles dealing with this aspect, which 
deals with the consequences of state responsibility once it has arisen. 
Instead therefore we must summarily look at customary law as it has 
developed to a great extent in this field, and numerous judgements of 
courts and tribunals. Most famous among the latter of course is the 
Chorz6w Factory Case, decided by the PCIJ in 1928.19 
A breach of an international obligation incurring state responsibility 
according to customary law and jurisprudence can be repaired (the 
Chorz6w Factory judgement speaks of "reparation") theoretically in 
three ways.2O The first and most logical way is that of restitutio in 
integrum, i.e. of undoing the wrongdoing and restoring for the full 
100% the preexisting situation. If restitutio in integrum is considered 
impossible (for instance, if damage has arisen as a consequence of the 
breach which turns out to be irreparable, such as the death of 
nationals) or senseless (for example in the case of nationalization of 
foreign assets), compensation, usually in monetary form, is an accepted 
substitute. That compensation is conceptually a substitute is clear from 
the fact that compensation-in-full should in fact be of such value as to 
equal the value of the damage done: compensation therefore being in a 
sense not restitutio in integrum in actual value but in theoretical, 
monetary value. The third form of reparation finally is satisfaction, for 
instance by way of official apologies. This kind of reparation is 
especially relevant in cases where no material damage has occurred as 
a consequence of the breach, such as by the mere intrusion of foreign 
aircraft in the sovereign airspace of another state. 
3. The confusion: 
liability in general international law 
Then as to liability in general international law. Here, immediately 
confusion starts, already with respect to the term itself taken in 
isolation.21 The term 'liability', just as the term 'responsibility', is an 
age-old term; in contrast however to (state) responsibility, liability is 
derived for a large part from domestic legal orders. Perhaps this 
already accounted for this first measure of confusion. An almost 
uniform element however could at least be found in the close relation 
of liability to the concept of damage.22 
Consequently, also international liability is closely related to damage; 
the ILC's praft articles as they are being developed on this topic 
starting from the First Report of the ILC presented in 1980, only 
confirm this. Here we arrive at the first fundamental element of 
definition also dealt with in respect of international responsibility and 
fmd it to be radically different here, for damage is on the contrary 
indeed an indispensable criterion for liability to arise - as can already 
be deduced from the provisional title of the ILC's Draft articles,23 but 
also from the numerous other treaties in international law dealing with 
liability.24 
Damage however, although not an indispensable criterion for 
responsibility, is far from unimportant in that concept, and it is here 
that more confusion arises due to the resulting partial overlap with 
liability. An internationally wrongful act namely can lead to damage or 
consist itself of the causing of damage,25 in other words and in actual 
fact, damage is most often an important element in defining existence 
of an internationally wrongful act. Thus, in cases of acts by one state 
causing damage to another state, its nationals or its property, both 
principles can become involved at the same time, with all due 
consequences. This became already clear in cases of transboundary 
environmental pollution, where the causation of damage or harm 
through pollution to another state's territory (and not the actual activity 
causing the harm) was the quintessence of the violation of an 
international obligation not to do so. 
The ILC evaded this problem by moving towards a definition of 
liability where the concept of liability would only apply for damage 
arising out of acts not in violation of international law, excluding any 
overlap.26 The element of breach, of objective fault, which had to be 
present in the case of responsibility, had to be absent in order to 
invoke liability. In a negative way, breach thereby became an 
indispensable element of liability also. As under 'traditional' liability the 
question of breach had been irrelevant, the ILC seemed to act 
clarifyingly by thus nullifying the overlap. 
At the same time however another kind of confusion is actually created 
by this drawing of a firm borderline. For in that case, damage in case 
of an internationally wrongful act would be dealt with under the law of 
state responsibility, and damage in other cases by liability, whereas it is 
often very hard to precisely determine whether damage would be 
allowed if paid for (i.e., a case for liability) or whether damage would 
be illegal and this illegality would have to be redeemed by paying for it 
(i.e., a case for responsibility). 
It becomes a matter then of how the obligation in dispute was exactly 
phrased, and the point is that one can phrase almost every obligation 
both as: you are allowed to do it, provided you pay for it, and as: you 
are not allowed to do it, so if you still go ahead, you'll have to pay for 
it. Are semantics to fulfil such a central role here? 
Here we have already entered into discussion of the third element of 
analysis, concerning the consequences of liability when compared to 
responsibility. Whereas state responsibility theoretically can be 
redeemed in three different ways, (international) liability knows only 
one kind of redemption: payment of compensation for the damage.27 
Liability thus, in contrast to responsibility, was seen as a primary 
obligation under the ILC's definition, arising without need for a (prior) 
violation of a(nother) primary rule of international law, and being 
instead the simple consequence of damage.28 The consequence of 
liability thus was, as simply, the duty to wipe out the liability itself, by 
repairing the damage.29 
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The borderline drawn by the ILC between liability and responsibility, 
by means of defining them as primary respectively secondary 
obligations, however, is purely artificial. If the primary obligation, to 
pay for damage under liability-rules, would not be fulfilled, the 
secondary obligation to repair for this wrongful act of non-fu1filment of 
an international obligation to pay would come into play - logically 
consisting of a duty to pay for the damage by way of monetary 
compensation! Compensation could include so-called punitive 
damages,SO whereas these would be excluded under liability because 
there would have been no violation of an international obligation which 
was to be punished for. At what point furthermore, in time or 
otherwise, the primary obligation becomes the secondary obligation, 
unless specified in treaties on liability,31 can only be a matter of 
arbitrariness. 
An extra complication could moreover arise if damage would mean 
different things under the two different principles, in the sense e.g. of 
including or excluding immaterial or indirect damage. All in all, the 
ILC thus perhaps manages to prevent the confusion of liability and 
responsibility, however at the cost of having two clearly different 
concepts whose alternative application depends on a non-existing 
borderline and is thereby far from clear. 
Finally the second element of analysis as dealt with in relation to 
responsibility, of the special problem related to attributability,32 the 
question of due care obligations, must be dealt with here. In respect of 
state responsibility, in a sense the doctrine of due care forms a certain 
divergence from the general theory, perceived by the ILC as being 
objective; objective fault being no criterion. Here "fault or negligence 
becomes an element of state responsibility simply because the due care 
obligation itself requires negligent conduct before this obligation can be 
said to have been breached".33 Thus, "Draft Article 23 [containing the 
due care with respect to state responsibility] ( ... ) embraces all sorts of 
primary duties in the category 'to prevent an event''',34 and therefore 
due care is itself a secondary obligation as defined by the ILC. 
When turning to liability, the ambiguity once more becomes clear. 
Here, due care must be seen as a primary duty to prevent harm and 
damage as the consequence of acts of persons under its jurisdiction 
- where according to the ILC the mere fact of harm arising already 
means that the duty has been violated, that the "care" taken was less 
that was "due". That means, that even if maximum care would have 
been taken, as soon as damage occurred the due care obligation would 
have been violated,35 which of course makes the use of the word "due" 
superfluous and hollow, and effectively turns due care liability into 
some kind of risk liability. Thus, it really shifts the attributability: where 
under the doctrine of state responsibility a state can only become 
directly responsible for its own acts, and due care responsible for 
private acts only if it failed to take due care, under the doctrine of 
international liability a state is obliged to pay as the liable entity, no 
matter whether it concerns damage arising out of its own acts or out or 
private acts, and even if the state in question had taken all reasonable 
measures in the latter case to try to prevent such damage from arising! 
Both state responsibility and international liability for non-state acts 
can concern persons as well as territory under the jurisdiction of the 
state in question. Therefore, the ILC's borderline is necessary to 
prevent overlap where responsibility, potentially leading to a duty to 
repair by means of monetary compensation, could be taken away when 
due care was proven, but where liability, potentially leading to a duty to 
pay for the damage, could not be excused. 
At the same time of course, it suddenly makes the semantic analyses of 
how exactly a certain international obligation was phrased, of far from 
academic importance - and the fact, that the ILC's creation of a 
distinction by speaking of primary and secondary obligations turned out 
to be an arbitrary and therefore by definition non-legal distinction, a 
fundamental practical problem. For whether a state is according to a 
certain rule to be held liable for damage resulting out of a perfectly 
legal act (and has to pay for that damage), or to be held responsible 
for a breach of international law resulting in damage or itself consisting 
of the infliction of damage (and has to provide reparation for such 
damage in the form of compensation) can now make all the difference, 
if responsibility and liability are invoked in respect of acts perpetrated 
by its nationals or from its territory. The best example under 
international law once more is the field of environmental pollution 
emanating from within a certain state's territory: since the famous Trail 
Smelter Arbitrationoo the borderline between environmental harm that 
could be bought off and thus was allowed if only compensated for, and 
enviroumental harm that amounted to an international wrong for which 
compensation was due, has tend to get lost time and again during 
analysis.s7 
4. The ILC's matrix: 
misconstruction or misconception? 
The ILC's effort to use the term 'liability' exclusively for acts not 
prohibited as such under international law indeed draws a clear 
borderline between cases where responsibility was involved and those 
involving liability - in theory. This distinction was illustrated by the 
provisional title of the Draft articles on International liability as 
proposed by ILC Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter,3S and supported by the 
incorporation of the rule that acts precluding wrongfulness under the 
doctrine of state responsibility did not thereby exclude liability for 
damage, damage which then must have been considered to be 
consequential to an act as such not unlawful.s9 
In effect, it created a definitional matrix, which could become the new 
rule in respect of general international liability if the scheme is to be 
continued in the final draft. The matrix would build upon damage and 
breach as the two relevant criteria, in each case attributability really 
being taken for granted. An act of a state involving no breach and no 
damage would be no problem, international law would not become 
involved any further. A breach but no damage would invoke 
responsibility, with the reparation in any case not being of the 
compensation type. A breach and damage also would invoke 
responsibility, this time the reparation at least including compensation. 
No breach but damage finally would invoke liability, with the duty to 
compensate as a necessary corollary. 
On closer look, however, the problem turned out to only have been 
shifted by creation of the matrix, not solved. It remained semantics, as 
the precise formulation of the relevant rule would provide for the 
decision whether to apply responsibility or liability, which in the case of 
damage could lead to the same kind of obligation in terms of paying 
for the damage yet to different outcomes as to what damages would in 
the end have to be paid. At the same time, the artificial borderline 
drawn by the ILC between liability and responsibility turned out to be 
even more arbitrary itself, which of course compounded that problem. 
And finally, these conclusions turned out to be more than academic, as 
an analysis of the problem of responsibility and/or liability for non-state 
acts, by means of due care, made clear that under responsibility states 
could be exempted from paying for damage if they have proven due 
care to try to prevent the damage arising on the hands of their 
nationals or emanating from its territory, whereas under liability states 
have to pay for damage as soon as it arises, even if they had done their 
utmost to prevent it. 
The ILC has thus perhaps managed to avoid the misconstruction of 
liability and responsibility as two overlapping concepts, without 
borderlines and not easily distinguishable while being presented as if 
they were, which creates a lot of confusion by making it possible 
sometimes to apply two different but intricately interlinked notions to 
the same case - with different and therefore conflicting results. On the 
other hand and at the same time, this turns out to be at the cost of the 
misconception that having two clearly distinguishable concepts would 
solve the problem as their alternative application would thereby 
become clear, whereas in actual fact this alternative application turns 
out to hinge on semantics and vague or even non-existing 
borderlines. The two concepts therefore could still lead to 
fundamentally different results in respect of cases of damage, especially 
as far as non-state activities would be concerned. 
Damage would still need to be paid for in the case of state activities, 
whether as compensation for an internationally wrongful act or as 
consequence of established liability. Even here, however, different 
concepts of damage in regard of responsibility and liability respectively 
could lead to different results. A thorough analysis of the semantic 
problem (being the basis of the problems resulting from the ILC's 
approach), in order to conclude in each case of international damage 
whether responsibility or liability should take account of that damage, 
and which could possibly rectify the misconception, has meanwhile 
become impossible due to the traditional misconstrnction whereby both 
terms have been used for decades almost interchangeably in many 
cases and at any rate undefined most the time, by courts and expert 
authors as well as by treaty-negotiating governments and treaty-making 
diplomats. 
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5. The starting point: 
liability in space law 
Now we leave this earthbound realm and enter into the lofty arena of 
space law, where of course responsibility and liability are also two 
fundamental, mnch discussed principles. This time it is easiest to start 
analysis with liability, which is in regard of space law (and in contrast 
to general international law) the most elaborated of the two principles 
as a special Liability Convention40 was devoted to develop the 
provisions of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. 
Article VII, of course, itself provides the basis. States are 
internationally liable for damage41 to other States, their property or 
persons, as far as caused by the former States' space objects - which 
for our purpose may be considered for a moment as being equal to 
damage resulting from an activity in space. As to the necessary 
ingredients for space liability, this leads us to the same conclusion as in 
respect of international liability: damage is the only, indispensable 
criterion,42 nor breach of an international obligation (objective fault), 
nor subjective fault in the sense of intent or negligence are necessary to 
invoke liability - in respect of damage on the earth or to an aircraft to 
begin with.43 
Things at ftrst sight seem to lie differently in respect of damage 
inflicted in space, to (another) space object,44 (which means it only 
relates to part of the liability-under-space-law concept) where fault 
seems to playa role. For liability-purposes, the assessment of relative 
fault on the hand of the state inflicting the damage when compared to 
the state whose object is damaged (and most probably the states 
involved are both victim and inflictor of damage) is important. It is on 
an altogether different level however, namely between two participants 
in the same business, that it becomes relevant, and it has nothing to do 
with a breach of an international obligation, with objective fault;45 and 
in effect it also does not have therefore the impact of making subjective 
fault a necessary criterion. The fault meant here, is not intent or 
negligence in respect of a rule of international law,46 but intent or 
negligence to cause damage in respect of someone else active in space; 
hence, it becomes relative to the fault of that other someone active in 
space. Fault in respect of damage inflicted in space is automatic, is a 
given circumstance once two space objects have created such damage, 
only its relative division between two ( or more) space actors involved is 
a matter for debate; whereas the fault alluded to under the previous 
analysis is one that can very well be absent as a whole. It therefore 
actually has not the effect here of creating or denying liability, only of 
making a difference in regard of the consequences of liability, its 
division between two states involved in a space accident, once it has 
arisen - namely as to the amount of damage which should be 
compensated for in respect of each other. This liability therefore really 
is of another kind, constituting a sort of inter-party liability as opposed 
to third party liability where innocent third parties are supposed to 
suffer.47 
Article III of the Liability Convention is confusingly drafted in this 
regard, stating liability sunnnarily to exist "only if the damage is due to 
its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible". That could 
only mean, however, that in case of "shared" fault, as we are dealing 
here with accidents in outer space, the liability exists to the extent of 
the share - which really is tantamount to saying that damage to each 
other has to be compensated for only to the extent of the share; 
liability under Article III becomes a measure of quantity instead of a 
qualitative principle, with relative application.48 As explained, one fault 
or other has to be present for the accident in question to arise; Article 
III divides liability according to this kind of fault among the parties 
involved, it does not change the 'total' of fault or the 'total' of liability 
present, it only deals with how they are to be apportioned. 
Likewise, the absolute liability of Article II of the Liability Convention 
can be exonerated and changed into liability based on fault when, and 
to the extent that, it can be established under Article VI(l) that "the 
damage has resulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence or 
from an act or omission done with the intent to cause damage on the 
part of a claimant state or of natural or juridical persons it represents". 
This confirms the aforementioned conclusion of liability being used as a 
quantity, as this phrase effectively turns the 
damage-on-earth-or-in-the-air-cases also into cases of inter-party 
liability, the third party no longer being an innocent party. Once more, 
breach is not relevant for the distinction between absolute and 
fault-liability, not even SUbjective fault with regard to the breach. Only 
subjective fault in respect of the damage is relevant, and this by 
defmition means that it has become relative to the fault of the other 
party. So, liability as a qualitative principle exists for damage, 
independent of breach or subjective fault; only in cases where the other 
party must be deemed to have been at fault, too, does another kind of 
fault come into play, to "divide" the liability or more accurately of 
course the consequences of that liability according to relative fault. 
Meanwhile we have already arrived at the issue of the consequences of 
liability. The Liability Convention is clear in this respect: the state 
found liable for the damage will have to pay for it, "in accordance with 
international law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to 
provide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the 
person ( ... ), State or international organization ( ... ) to the condition 
which would have existed if the damage had not occurred".49 This 
formula presupposes full compensation for the damage as the. 
consequence of liability, which can only mean that liability indeed 
relates to the total amount of damage, and not to any part of it. The 
damage can not suddenly be less, when it turns out that fault was 
'divided' between the relevant parties; so it should not be the liability 
which is thereby considered diminished, but the consequence of that 
liability. 
While the use of the term "reparation" and the fact that the height of 
the amount to be paid for the damage is determined by what real 
restitutio in integrum would cost, seem to point confusingly towards 
elements of state responsibility under general international law, it may 
safely be said for the moment that the consequence of liability for 
damage under space law, being solely the duty to pay for the damage, 
is in line with the consequence of international liability as traditionally 
defined by general international law,5O where also real restitutio in 
integrum and satisfaction are excluded. Thus, breach or no breach of 
space law, if damage occurs, one has to pay for it. 
Finally as to the problem of attributability in relation to due care: as 
ouly states (and international organizations) can become liable under 
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention, the 
question arises for what kind of acts they are liable, especially for what 
kind of non-state acts. Much has been written about this subject,51 
wherefore a sunnnary suffices. Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty 
together with Article I( c) of the Liability Convention provide for a 
famous fourfold definition of a "launching state", which is the liable 
state for the damage caused by the space object in question. Only one 
of the four ("a state which launches") points exclusively to an act of the 
state, the other three could very well (partially) include non-state acts 
for which the launching state(s) still can be held liable. 
What must be noted especially here is again the similarity to the 
traditional concept of international liability which on this point has 
been duly elaborated by the ILC's Draft. For the application of liability 
it makes no difference, under the fourfold definition of "launching 
state", whether the launch was in many aspects a private activity or 
completely a state affair. As soon as damage occurs, it has to be paid 
for, and no amount of due care taken in respect of private activities 
cansing the damage can excuse the launching state in this respect. 
Once more, the term "due care" seems to be not really appropriate. 
Sunnnarizing, liability under space law has, as much as under 
traditional general international law, damage as its sole criterion (apart 
from attributability of course); neither subjective fault (culpa, intent, 
negligence), nor objective fault (i.e. a mere breach of law) are 
necessary for liability to come into play. Logically then, the two other 
elements of analysis do not differ either: the ouly consequence of 
liability is the duty to pay for the damage, and due care liability is not 
so much contingent upon due care as it is contingent upon damage. 
Thus, space law in regard of liability as a whole does not conform to 
the ILC's matrix, but rather to the traditional concept of international 
liability. The consequences of adhering to that misconstruction will 
become clear when we now turn to responsibility as it exists in space 
law. 
6. The confusion: 
responsibility in space law 
Of course, responsibility in space law bases itself upon Article VI of 
the Outer Space Treaty,52 which makes states internationally 
responsible for national space activities. The term 'responsibility' is 
used in this very basic principle of space law in the same sense as in 
general international law, as it is being codified at the moment by the 
ILC, because it is added that states are responsible for these activities 
to be in conformity with the rules of the Outer Space Treaty (and 
therefore to the whole body of space law which after all is an extension 
and elaboration of this treaty) and international law; in other words, 
with the lex specialis of space law and the lex generalis of public 
internationallaw.53 
International state responsibility, in space law as much as elsewhere, 
therefore arises in case of activities .being in violation of relevant legal 
obligations, those being primary obligations of (space) law.54 It is thus 
dependent, to begin with, on the fIrst criterion, that of an 
internationally wrongful act. Damage (as much as subjective fault) is 
not a criterion, although here as much as elsewhere damage is not 
excluded either. The overlap arising out of the misconstruction thns will 
already become apparent. 
The second criterion necessary for state responsibility is also included 
in Article VI: the question of attributabili~, and thereby we arrive at 
our second element of analysis. This is taken care of by the formula of 
"national activities in outer space", whatever its precise definition; 
Article VI itself only speaks of national activities as being either 
activities of "governmental agencies" or of "non-governmental entities". 
It is in as far as the latter is concerned, that the question of due care 
responsibility arises. In deviation from the general law of state 
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responsibility, states here however are directly responsible for non-state 
activities, instead of merely due care, as no difference is made by 
Article VI in respect of the kind of responsibility to be applicable in 
the case of "governmental agencies" on the one, respectively 
"non-governmental entities" on the other hand.58 
This smacks of the "due care" liability, both under space and under 
general law, as even if the "care" taken is found "due", responsibility will 
not thereby cease to exist. One effect of the misconception created by 
the ILC's matrix, in the sense of creating a difference between due care 
responsibility and due care liability in this respect, at least has been 
prevented in space law. Neither under responsibility, nor under liability 
are states able to dodge a potential duty to pay for damage by claiming 
to have taken due care, whereby the question of whether to apply the 
one or the other becomes of less practical relevance. An exception, 
however, already exists here in respect of remote sensing activities, 
where international responsibility apparently only applies for state 
activities,57 and classical due care shonld take care of non-state 
activities. 
Nevertheless, in view of the familiarity of due care responsibility for 
private activities either personally or territorially emanating from within 
the state's jurisdiction with the responsibility arising under Article VI 
for activities of non-governmental activities, linked as it is to the duty of 
authorization and continuing supervision by "the appropriate state" 
implying such jurisdiction, this may help to solve the longstanding 
discussion on what should be read by "national activities" and "the 
appropriate state".58 In this light, national activities must be deemed to 
encompass both activities by nationals, whether natural or juridical and 
activities undertaken from within the territory of the state in 
question.59 Responsibility can arise for the appropriate state to the 
extent that those activities thns fall under its jurisdiction, for which 
authorization and continuing supervision as provided for by Article VI 
are a sort of minimum requirements.eo 
This definition of national activities of course implies that in respect of 
a specific activity there can be more than one appropriate state-
namely to the extent that jurisdictions overlap; this problem of 
concurrent jurisdiction however exists in general international law as 
well, and various methods and techniques exist there to solve it. We 
need not go into that problem any further, suffice it to state here that 
not following this line of reasoning would both seem unlogical, and not 
solve the problems when the comparison with liability is made - if it 
not even leads to more problems. 
For this reason we now turn to the third element of analysis, the 
consequences once state responsibility has arisen. Article VI itself is 
silent in this respect, therefore one cannot do anything else than to 
turn to general international law once more to look for an explanation. 
Here, we arrive once more at the doctrine of reparation: whatever the 
violation of space law invoking a state's responsibility, this responsibility 
can only be taken care of by restitutio in integrum, compensation 
andlor satisfaction. What is, in any actual situation, the right form of 
reparation of course depends on the content of the (primary) rule 
violated and the extent of the violation. 
One could imagine for instance that a violation of the rule that the 
ownership of property like a satellite is not affected by its presence in 
outer space,61 by capturing the satellite with a space shuttle, can be 
redeemed by restitutio in integrum, meaning release and restoration of 
the satellite to its former place (the question of potential material 
damage taken apart). Likewise one could imagine that the violation of 
the right to freely exploit and use outer space,62 for example by claims 
of the underlying state that a satellite circling at thonsands of 
kilometres above the earth falls under its sovereign jurisdiction, should 
be redeemed by the third possible form of reparation, satisfaction, for 
example by official apologies (once more assuming that no material 
damage had taken place). 
The crucial point is what happens if damage does arise. Satisfaction 
will not be enough, either restitutio in integrum, logically costing the 
state providing for it the full amount necessary to restore the damage, 
or (monetary) compensation which allows the state suffering the 
damage to restore that damage to the full - and thus, conceptually and 
theoretically, involves the same amount of money - is necessary. Thus, 
states could suddenly find themselves under an obligation to pay for 
damage under Article VI, even if they have domestically arranged for 
complete coverage of the situations falling under Article VII of the 
Outer Space Treaty and the whole of the Liability Convention63 - or if 
they have taken the basic 'precaution' of not signing the Liability 
Convention while being a party to the Outer Space Treaty. 
For this latter situation to be problematic, of course it has to be 
presumed that the Liability Convention has not become customary law 
to the same extent as the Outer Space Treaty through being a more 
elaboration of the latter'S Article VII, thus effectively turning Article 
VII into a mere statement of principle. That would, of course, for 
fairness' sake, make Article VI a statement of principle to just the 
same extent (and it may well be so, as the Outer Space Treaty is very 
often referred to also as the 'Principles TreatY); but where Article VII 
and the Liability Convention would be really necessary for creating 
liability-rules in space, a fmding that Article VI would be a mere 
principle could not prevent the application anyhow of the fundamental 
doctrine of state responsibility as developed under general international 
law. Thus it would indeed make a difference. 
7. Conclusion: confusion or a third approach? 
What that means, becomes clear when we again take into account that 
the misconstruction as it existed has been maintained in space law; the 
overlap has not been deleted. In other words, why is it important, for 
instance, that states under space law can become liable for damage 
arising, having to pay for it, while at the same time they can become 
responsible for a breach of space law involving this same damage, 
seemingly meaning they have to pay for it - again. Of course, the 
damage should not be compensated for twice, once under the heading 
of state responsibility, once under the heading of international 
liability.64 The misconstruction however would seem to point exactly in 
that direction. If logic would prevent it nevertheless, what would then 
be necessary? Should one choose? Luckily enough, the problem 
regarding due care at least would not be important for such a choice 
under space law as it would have become under general international 
law. The field of environmental pollution will not pose basic problems 
in this respect; in other words, it does not matter so much whether 
privately caused pollution leads to due care responsibility or to due 
care liability. 
Uuluckily, however, the same does not hold good in respect of the 
definitions of damage. Damage regarding liability is pretty well-defined 
in space law;65 damage as a component part of state responsibility for 
space activities however is not. It could include, in contrast to the 
former, other forms of immaterial damage, indirect damages, or even 
punitive damages. It remains important therefore to decide on 
application of the one or the other - and this is exactly what the 
misconstruction turns into a haphazard and arbitrary affair. 
Moreover, so far we have considered only cases where damage would 
fall, in principle, under both categories. What, however, if the damage 
could arise outside of the liability-rules, yet invoking the 
responsibility-rules? After all, in space law the scope of the one is 
defined rather differently from the scope of the other, Article VI and 
Article VII (of course as elaborated by the Liability Convention) do 
not (automatically) cover the same cases. If Article VII does not 
completely cover all possible Article VI-cases, states may suddenly fwd 
out they have to pay compensation for damage (even if caused by 
non-state, private acts) on account of responsibility where they thought 
they covered the whole range of possibilities by heeding Article VII 
and the Liability Convention. 
Thus, it is necessary to look once more at the definition of 'national 
activities' and 'appropriate state'. If the definition of 'appropriate state' 
would completely coincide with the definition of 'launching state' as 
provided for, the problem of overlap at least would have been 
relegated to the realm of theory. 
If it were indeed to coincide however, an explanation would be 
necessary for the fact that 'activities' can become so remotely linked to 
a launching state that it would make little sense to link responsibility so 
directly to a launch (although the same would hold good for liability to 
a large extent as well); that responsibility in space law ouly covers 
activities in outer space, where liability in space law includes launchings 
as far as taking place on earth also (and even launchings that never 
really leave earth) and trajectories through air spaces following the 
launchings66; that Article VI and Article VII most assuredly use 
different language67; and most important, why a specific concept of 
liability as different from responsibility would be needed - when its 
cases would turn out to be almost completely covered by the other 
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concept. Thus, the misconstruction would continue in the sense of 
creating confusion whether to apply one or the other of two different 
but intricately interlinked and partially overlapping concepts to one and 
the same case, with potentially conflicting results as e.g. to (the amount 
of compensation due for) the damage. And here again the field of 
environmental pollution would be a special example of these problems, 
the borderline between damage, allowed-if-paid-for, and damage, not 
allowed and thus to be compensated, being undiscernible in this field. 
The difference between Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty, 
between "appropriate state" and "launching state" was elaborated 
before, being based on the logical interpretation of "national activities" 
as arising out of general international law. In this light, it is however 
certainly still possible for states to claim damages under the heading of 
state responsibility in cases where they can not do so under the heading of 
international liability. One need not even think of future spaceplanes or 
space stations to which notions of 'launching' and 'launching state' may 
no longer be found to, or decided upon not to apply; one can think of 
all space activities by non-governmental entities with respect to space 
objects launched from launch sites outside of territory or facilities of 
the state to which those entities belong and without that state procuring 
the launch or launching herself.as Those activities, of course, very well 
fit into the notion of 'national activities'. 
Therefore, perhaps the matrix of the ILC is to be preferred: liability, 
Article VII and the Liability Convention only becoming invoked as long 
as the damaging activity in itself is in conformity with international law, 
in other cases damage remaining to be redeemed through 
compensation for internationally wrongful acts. Apart from all the 
other difficulties with such an approach as analyzed before, once more 
especially the fact that the misconstruction that had arisen for the first 
time by the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty has taken root so 
forcefully through the Liability Convention itself, will however prevent 
the ILC's matrix from becoming reality. And even if that were not the 
case, it would make the matrix malfunctioning by creating 
misconceptions, as the borderlines between application of the one or 
the other principle would depend on semantics and vague or 
non-existing borderlines - and the Liability Convention to a large extent 
would become useless! 
Perhaps then, finally, it would be the best idea to amend the Liability 
Convention in order to widen its scope to all activities one way or 
another under the jurisdiction of an appropriate state, and delete the 
notion of launching state as far more activities then suggested or 
perceived can involve possible damage under space law where the 
actual link to the launching seems very remote. By thus making the 
jurisdiction of a state the pivotal point of attribution, the second 
element of analysis, that of atttributability including due care, would 
have been taken care of. 
At the same time, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty should be 
elaborated to the extent that for material damages, recourse would 
have to be had to Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty plus the 
Liability Convention, whereas for other kinds of damages, including the 
immaterial damage caused by the mere violation of a legal obligation of 
one state towards another, Article VI itself then would remain effective 
to the extent of providing for possibilities of restitutio in integrum, 
compensation for non-material damage (including for instance punitive 
damage) - which need not be monetary compensation - and 
satisfaction. This would solve the problems arising from the third 
element of analysis, that of the consequences of responsibility and 
liability. 
It is the other way round from what the ILC's misconception would 
suggest - which would amount to a need for equalizing the appropriate 
state to the launching state - whereas it would solve the present 
misconstruction: liability would not become a different principle, it 
would become part of the principle of state responsibility, taking care 
of all the latter's cases where (material) damage occurs. This, finally, 
would take care of the first element of analysis, that of the difference 
in constituent elements of the respective notions of responsibility and 
liability. At the same time it would turn around the ILC's method of 
construction in another sense than previously alluded to as well, for it 
would make rules of liability secondary, (or perhaps 'subsidiary' is a 
better word) to rules of responsibility instead of the other way 
round.Bs By making liability a subprinciple of responsibility namely, it 
would simply become applicable only once responsibility has already 
been found to be involved, as the main trigger, and, as a second 
criterion, read secondary trigger, material damage was seen to be 
involved.The fundamental doctrine of 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas', famous under general international law,70 would step in to 
make causation of harm or damage from within one state's jurisdiction 
to another state's territory, property, nationals, or nationals' property, 
as such an international wrongful act, triggering responsibility and, by 
the very reason of causing damage, consequently liability therefore -
just as is already in fact more or less the case in respect of 
transboundary environmental pollution. 
The practicality and chance of realization of such a turnaround, both in 
general international law and in space law, may be a matter for 
discussion; the simplicity of this construction to my opinion preventing 
both the misconstruction of space law and the misconception of the 
ILC seems appealing and is certainly worth further attention. 
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